Financial constraints versus financial flexibility: What drives zero-debt puzzle in emerging markets? by Iliasov, D. V. & Kokoreva, M. S.
407Financial Constraints versus Financial Flexibility: What Drives Zero-Debt Puzzle in Emerging Markets?
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS VERSUS FINANCIAL 
FLEXIBILITY: WHAT DRIVES ZERO-DEBT PUZZLE  
IN EMERGING MARKETS?
D. V. IlIasoV, M. s. KoKoreVa
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
This study is focused on gaps in the theory of capital structure research regarding the 
phenomenon of zero-debt behavior. On the sample of firms from 21 countries with emerg-
ing capital markets over the period of 2010–2015, we show that the zero-debt policy choice 
is firstly driven by financial flexibility motive, while financial constraints could be regarded 
as the second motive. We show that major determinants of the zero-leverage choice are 
growth opportunities, profitability, business risk and cash holdings. We find that all these 
firms are smaller, less profitable, riskier and possess high cash holdings. Moreover, we find 
that macroeconomic conditions have lower influence on the debt policy decision in com-
parison with corporate determinants.
Keywords: financial constraints, financial flexibility, zero-debt, capital structure.
JEL: G32.
Российский журнал менеджмента
16 (3): 407–434 (2018)
Russian Management Journal
16 (3): 407–434 (2018)
This paper is an output of a research project implemented within NRU HSE’s Annual Thematic Plan for 
Basic and Applied Research. Any opinions or claims contained in this paper do not necessarily reflect the 
views of HSE.
Postal Address: 20 Myasnitskaya ul., National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 
101000, Russian Federation.
© D. V. Iliasov, M. S. Kokoreva, 2018
https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu18.2018.305
One of the puzzles in capital structure (CS) 
theory that have not been fully explained 
yet, is the presence of firms following the 
low leverage or even zero leverage policy. 
The proportion of zero-debt (ZD) firms var-
ies from country to country but the motives 
that make these firms to follow low debt or 
ZD policy are not clear and lack theoretical 
basis at the moment.
The classic theories of capital structure 
could not explain the puzzle. The static trade-
off theory [Kraus, Litzenberger, 1973] states 
that firms tend to reach the optimal capital 
structure through balancing between mar-
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ginal benefits (cheaper financing, tax-deduct-
ible interest expenses) and marginal costs 
(costs of financial distress) from the use of 
the additional unit of debt. But this theory 
could explain the decision of the company 
only in one period as it is not dynamic. In 
the case of unlevered companies, the theory 
would state that their bankruptcy costs are 
too high with the respect to tax gains, but 
previous research show that this is highly 
unlikely for zero-debt firms [Korteweg, 2010]. 
Dynamic trade-off theory version [Fischer, 
Heinkel, Zechner, 1989] that supposes the 
constant adjustment of the actual capital 
structure to the time-varying target level 
also fails to explain the existence of zero-debt 
companies.
An alternative model for capital struc-
ture, the pecking order theory [Myers, 
Majluf, 1984], explains the choice of financ-
ing with the following hierarchy of sources. 
Firstly, companies prefer to rely on their 
retained earnings reducing the costs of in-
formation asymmetry through not relying 
on external funds, then they could use the 
debt capital, while the equity issue is the 
most expensive source of financing that is 
applied as a  last resort. This order could 
be explained by the different degree of costs 
related to each source with the information 
asymmetry. However, in several emerging 
countries (China, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Russia) the empirical tests of this theory 
have shown the reverse order [Chen, 2004; 
Delcoure, 2007]. That fact led to the ap-
pearance of the modified pecking order 
theory, stating that financing through eq-
uity is more preferable than that of debt. 
Neither of theories specifications could ex-
plain however the stable zero-debt policy.
Even if the trade-off or the pecking or-
der theories could explain the zero leverage 
in one definite period, they are not able to 
explain the tendency of increasing zero-
debt firms nor they could be used to predict 
the financing choice of the firms in the 
future.
Estimation of ZD behavior can be useful 
and necessary from an empirical perspective, 
because the factors that lead firms to follow 
ZD policy are more likely to be dominating 
for these firms [Strebulaev, Yang, 2013]. 
Moreover, we should consider that ZD level 
may not be voluntary chosen. The mysteri-
ous fact in this pattern comes from the mo-
tives which force firms to follow no-debt 
policy, particularly the peculiarities of fi-
nancial constraints and a  mode deliberate 
choice of financial flexibility issues. Thus, 
we add to the literature on zero-debt puzzle 
by proposing the analysis of two motives 
(financial constraint and financial flexibil-
ity), that could possibly explain the increas-
ing role of ZD phenomenon.
Secondly, the current literature on ZD 
choice is mostly focused on developed mar-
kets.
In this research, we focus on the ZD phe-
nomenon of firms’ CS from the emerging 
markets, making a focus on the motives which 
cause these firms to adopt ZD policy. Even 
though there have been several attempts to 
analyze the ZD puzzle in separate emerging 
countries, our research tends to explain the 
ZD policy choice from different perspectives: 
the impact of firms’ financial constraints and 
financial flexibility motives, the influence of 
firm- and country-specific characteristics on 
the choice of ZD policy. Such complex and 
deep analysis hasn’t been made for the emerg-
ing capital markets yet.
We aim to provide the new insights into 
the zero-debt phenomenon by analyzing firms’ 
behavior, incentives and drivers for choosing 
the ZD policy. We evaluate the sample on the 
basis of financial flexibility and financial con-
straints motives to make comprehensive com-
parison of motives of the ZD choice among 
firms from emerging markets.
Our research demonstrates the results of 
capital structure choice among the large and 
small public companies with zero-debt (ZD), 
zero long-term debt (LTZD), almost zero-debt 
(AZD) levels from countries with emerging 
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markets (Asia, South and Central America, 
East Europe, Africa). We find out that search 
for financial flexibility tend to be the major 
motive to have zero-leverage which is fol-
lowed by financial constraints motive. We 
show that the major determinants that ex-
plain the choice of zero debt policy are those 
connected with the unpredicted future re-
sults of the firm. We prove moreover that 
macroeconomic conditions matter less for 
the zero-debt puzzle as compared with the 
corporate ones.
The rest of our study is structured as 
follows: we provide the literature overview, 
our next section describes the methodology 
of the analysis, the next one shows the sam-
ple construction and data description, then 
the section that covers the results of the 
econometric analysis and robustness tests 
follows, and the conclusions of our study 
are highlighted in the last section.
Literature review
The zero-debt phenomenon in related 
literature
The notion that debt conservatism of firms 
on average is mainly inherited by ZD firms 
has not gone unnoticed in financial research 
[Korteweg, 2010]. According to the recent 
studies, inability to use or increase debt lev-
el is inherited by firms at the introductory 
phase of the life-cycle, which can face volatile 
earnings and lower tangibility [Dang, 2011; 
Strebulaev, Yang, 2013; Bessler et al., 2013]. 
The ZD policy patterns are observed inter-
nationally and exist in around 20  countries 
[Bessler et al., 2013].
The literature on ZD follows two tracks. 
First, there have been several attempts to 
define the determinants of CS choice among 
the firms without debt in their balance sheet 
by separating these determinants into firm- 
and country-level characteristics [Bessler et 
al., 2013]. The second track analyzes the 
motives which cause firms to follow ZD in 
their CS.
Country-level characteristics. The possible 
explanation of the ZD phenomenon can be 
related to the country-specific factors which 
force firms to use debt conservative policy. 
Firms are more likely to have high debt ratios 
among countries with more stable and health-
ier economic conditions [Djankov, McLiesh, 
Shleifer, 2007]. A  negative relationship be-
tween the likelihood of a firm to be classified 
as ZD and the relative size of the deposits 
in a country [Bessler et al., 2013] was found, 
which indicates that financial intermediation 
encourages the use of corporate debt [Booth 
et al., 2001].
Despite the fact that the ZD puzzle exists 
at the major financial markets there are dif-
ferences among countries due to the level of 
their capital market development, creditors 
protection and legal system. Countries with 
high creditors protection and a  common law 
show the higher fraction of ZD firms [Bessler 
et al., 2013]. The common law system offers 
better protection for external investor than 
the civil law one, and as a result there is a bet-
ter access to external financing and higher 
security values [La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta 
et al., 2002].
The key characteristics of emerging mar-
kets are high investment opportunities and 
their respective risks, low stock markets li-
quidity, lack of information transparency, 
the importance of insider information and 
the lack of proof of the market efficiency 
hypothesis, as well as small volumes of trad-
ing in financial markets. These markets are 
also characterized by multilevel ownership 
structure leading to urgency of agency con-
flicts and, accordingly, the necessity of test-
ing the significance of agency capital struc-
ture motives in these markets [Bekaert, 
Harvey, 2003]. The authors also note an-
other no less important characteristic: the 
weak development of corporate governance, 
which, among other things, leads to high 
costs for equity. Therefore, we suppose that 
country level determinants could influence 
firms’ decisions to keep unlevered structure 
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in emerging capital markets. Firm-level char-
acteristics. Previous research show that ZD 
firms tend to be smaller, keep higher cash 
reserves, show higher market-to-book ratios 
and higher payout ratios [Dang, 2011; Devos 
et al., 2012; Strebulaev, Yang, 2013].
The ZD behavior can be related to busi-
ness risk. Taking into account that costs 
of financial distress are a positive function 
of asset volatility, the presence of ZD pat-
tern is likely to be increasing with higher 
business risk [Bessler et al., 2013]. This 
statement holds for firms possessing illiquid 
tangible assets which cannot be reallocated 
in the time of bad macroeconomic events 
[Campello, Giambona, 2013]. Decreasing or 
entirely de-levering the amount of debt in 
CS, a firm reduces shareholders’ total risk 
exposure [Meulbroek, 2002].
The link between CS and payout policies 
makes the understanding of the debt con-
servatism puzzle more complex. The ZD firms 
are not homogeneous but consist of two dis-
tinct groups with different levels of financial 
constraints, namely dividend payers and non-
payers [Dang, 2011]. Either debt or dividends 
can be effective tool to reduce the agency 
problems regarding free cash flow [Easter-
brook, 1984; La Porta et al., 2000; Fama, 
French, 2002]. Good equity market traits ZD 
firms accompanied by high dividend payouts 
[Byoun, Xu, 2013]. There are several agency 
models which assume that firms with high 
profitability direct larger fraction of their 
earnings to debt re-payments or dividend 
payouts to prevent managers from wasting 
free cash flow [Jensen, Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984]. As the 
dividend and debt policies help in solving free 
cash flow problems, firms obtaining large 
profits may show high payout ratio instead 
of using debt [DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 2007]. 
Therefore, highly profitable and mature firms 
may solve the agency problem caused by free 
cash flow, showing large dividend payouts 
instead of debt usage, and consequently be-
come debt-free.
The motives for zero-debt choice
Having defined the potential influential char-
acteristics, we still should analyze the mo-
tives which cause firms to restrain debt in 
their CS.
Current literature on ZD puzzle investi-
gated the following set of possible motives: 
financial constraints [Benmelech, Bergman, 
2009], financial flexibility [Marchica, Mura, 
2010; Muradoğlu, Sivaprasad, 2012; De 
Jong, Verbeek, Verwijmeren, 2012; Arslan-
Ayaydin, Florackis, Ozkan, 2014], manage-
rial entrenchment [Jensen, Meckling, 1976] 
or as a  reaction to macroeconomic changes 
[Antoniou, Guney, Paudyal, 2008; Cook, 
Tang, 2010]. As soon as the forced motive 
(financial constraints) and the deliberate one 
(financial flexibility) are the motives tend to 
play the major role according to the literature 
on developed markets, we investigate wheth-
er this is true for emerging markets as well 
controlling for macroecomic conditions. 
Thus, this paper contributes to the literature 
by checking the validity of these motives on 
emerging capital markets.
There are various suggestions about the 
characteristics of financially constrained 
firms. The presence of asymmetric informa-
tion related to asset risk leads to increased 
costs of debt issuance, and as a result firms 
are rationed by lenders [Stiglitz, Weiss, 
1981]. Also, the new borrowers without 
a  good reputation may face difficulties in 
getting debt financing [Diamond, 1991]. The 
ZD firms with limited choices are constrained 
in their debt capacity and unable to enter 
debt markets, but not all of them suffer from 
supply-side constraints, and thus ZD firms 
may be classified as either financially con-
strained or unconstrained [Bessler et al., 
2013]. Without having sufficient debt capac-
ity, the constrained firms have to follow the 
ZD policy. The use of external equity is more 
pronounced among small firms, high growth 
firms, and low profit firms [Fama, French, 
2005; Gatchev, Spindt, Tarhan, 2009]. 
Concerns about future financing abilities as 
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well as underinvestment situations are main 
determinants for constrained firms regarding 
cash holdings [Almeida, Campello, Weisbach, 
2011].
The financial flexibility is the ability of 
an institution to make effective measures for 
trends changes of cash flow as a response on 
the unexpected needs and opportunities 
[King’wara, 2015]. The decision to issue debt 
is desirable, whilst the borrowings opportu-
nity costs suggest that the target CS is more 
conservative than predicted by the trade-off 
model, and firms which stay financially flex-
ible keep large cash holdings [DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, Whited, 2011]. Also, these firms 
are able to reduce investment distortions due 
to their better access to debt markets during 
crisis times. These firms are aiming to save 
debt capacity for more constrained future pe-
riods [De Jong, Verbeek, Verwijmeren, 2012].
Implications of current literature  
to the zero-debt puzzle among the 
emerging markets
The CS puzzle presence among firms in 
Central-Eastern Europe provides some facts 
and questions, which cannot be explained 
using traditional approaches. There is a rel-
atively low debt level among East European 
firms [Jõeveer, 2006]. The research uses 
the country- and firm-specific factors as 
the main determinants of leverage change 
for firms with different size — small or 
large ones. The low level of debt financing 
in Hungary and Poland relates to supply-
side effect [Cornelli, Portes, Schaffer, 1996; 
Hussain, Nivorozhkin, 1997]. The finan-
cial constraints among Hungarian firms 
are the result of the combination of the 
financial incentives of firms and credit ra-
tioning within the financial environment 
[Nivorozhkin, 2007]. These constraints can 
impede the access of firms to long-term 
financing as well as their ability to grow 
[Klapper, Sarria-Allende, Sulla, 2002].The 
debt ratio of firms which belong to the tran-
sition countries remains lower than in the 
EU countries [Nivorozhkin, 2005]. The de-
velopment of credit markets and economic 
environment stabilization in the emerg-
ing countries can explain the variation of 
firm’s  debt ratio.
Literature on zero-debt puzzle in emerg-
ing markets has only started to appear.
From the comparison of firms in developed 
and emerging markets it was found out that 
the culture and attitude to debt matter for 
the zero-debt decisions [Ghoul et al., 2018]. 
As the sample included the data of 1990–2010 
it lacks the period of the major zero-debt firms 
rate increase, which could be provoked by dif-
ferent motives. The research on Indian market 
[Deb, Banerjee, 2015] provide a focus on the 
performance of zero-debt and levered firms 
showing that the formers’ results are greater 
for the studied period of 2000–2007.
Considering the lack of research on the 
motives of ZD puzzle in the emerging cap-
ital market, we focus our research on the 
issue to provide a  contribution to the lit-
erature on capital structure formation.
Methodology
We start the analysis from defining two mo-
tives measures: the financial constraints 
measure and the financial flexibility meas-
ure. According to the previous section, be-
ing the financially constrained or uncon-
strained, and financially flexible or inflex-
ible, the firms’ motives to adopt ZD policy 
should differ. Our hypotheses could be di-
vided into two groups: first group estimates 
the determinants of probability to be debt-
free, the second one tests the characteristics 
inherited by the ZD firms.
The determination of financial constraints 
and financial flexibility measures
Financial constraints. Existing literature 
aims to evaluate financial constraints from 
firms’ statements relating to their funding 
situation or changes in investment plans, 
their actions (dividends paying or not), or 
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their characteristics (age or size, having low 
leverage or without credit rating) [Farre-
Mensa, Ljungqvist, 2016].
The one of the most popular financial con-
straints measure according to the frequency 
of usage in studies is the KZ index [Farre-
Mensa, Ljungqvist, 2016]. This index has 
been developed by [Kaplan, Zingales, 1997] 
using a text-based approach. The actual KZ 
index uses five readily financial variables: 
cash flow, market-to-book, leverage, divi-
dends, and cash holdings [Lamont, Polk, Saá-
Requejo, 2001]. The index loads positively 
on market-to-book and leverage and nega-
tively on cash flow, dividends, and cash. There 
is implicit assumption that the financial con-
straints don’t  vary over time not over the 
business cycle.
In [Hadlock, Pierce, 2010] authors have 
updated [Kaplan, Zingales, 1997] text-based 
approach and have created their own index 
of financial constraints (SA index). We use 
the SA index because it is based on the size 
and age of the firm, the influential firm char-
acteristics, which are less dependent on the 
accounting standard and are more transpar-
ent on emerging markets as compared to the 
elements of KZ index. Moreover, this meas-
ure helps us to enlarge the sample, since 
size and age information is available for 
greater number of companies.1 This index 
proposes negative loads for size and age, and 
positive one for size-squared:
SA  =  0.737 ⋅ Size  +  0.043 ⋅ Size2  – 
      –  0.040 ⋅ Age, 
(1)
1 SA index uses the text-based analysis to deter-
mine the respective coefficients. This index is widely 
used for determining the firms’ financial constraints 
issues by both academics and market practitioners in 
developed and emerging economies, though the coef-
ficients haven’t been recalculated. Due to the lack of 
evidence of SA index recalculation, we have adopted 
the approach that has proved its reliability for our 
analysis. Considering the potential bias of such ap-
proach, recalculation of SA index based on text 
analysis of sampled firms seemed highly difficult to 
conduct and was of the scope of our research.
where Size is the logarithm of the total as-
sets, Age is the number of years the firm 
is listed or the number of years after the 
IPO took place.
As with the KZ index, subsequent users 
of the SA index proceed by applying Hadlock 
and Pierce’s  coefficients to their own sam-
ples [Farre-Mensa, Ljungqvist, 2016].
The higher the value of index, the more 
constrained a firm is. The agreement among 
the researchers is to classify the top tercile 
or fourth and fifth quintiles of firms as con-
strained and the bottom tercile or first and 
second quintiles as unconstrained.
In our research, we use the index group-
ing over quintiles and drop the third quin-
tile to avoid misspecification issue.
Financial flexibility. In the modern li-
terature, there are several definitions of 
financial flexibility. Based on the previous 
literature, we chose the measure that is 
based on excess cash estimates since it is 
closely correlated with financial flexibility 
[Hu, Jiang, Lee, 2013; Lee, Moon, 2011; 
Blau, Fuller, 2008; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
2006]. Our measure of excess cash is cal-
culated through an optimal cash holdings 
model to find the required level of cash 
reserve [Arslan-Ayaydin, Florackis, Ozkan, 
2014]. The construction of the equation is 
made as follow2:
Cash Holdingsi  = 
=  β0  +  β1MTBi  + 
+  β2Sizei  +  β3CFTAi  +  β4Levi  + 
+  β5NWCTAi  +  β6CAPEXTAi  + 
+  β7RDi  +  β8Divi  +  εi, 
(2)
2 The model also includes the mean cash-flow 
standard deviation of firms in the same industry 
over previous 5 year (INDSIGM) as an additional 
explanatory variable [Opler et al., 1999]. However, 
we could not obtain necessary information for firms 
in our sample and removed this variable from our 
model. Also, the model is estimated for each year 
and industry separately, which means that there 
is no need to control for year and industry dum-
mies in the model.
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where i stands for i-firm, MTB is the mar-
ket-to-book ratio, Size is the logarithm of 
total assets, CFTA is the net income before 
depreciation and amortization over book 
value of total assets, Lev is total debt over 
book value of total assets, NWCTA is net 
working capital over book value of total as-
sets, CAPEXTA is capital expenditure over 
book value of total assets, RD is the value 
of R&D  expenses over the total assets and 
Div is the dummy variable set to one if 
a firm pays dividends in that year and zero 
otherwise, εi is the residuals. These residu-
als εi of the model are used as a  proxy for 
the excess cash measure. Further, this meas-
ure is grouped according to the median 
value: flexible — higher than median, and 
inflexible — lower than median.
Based on this measure, we classify firms 
as flexible and inflexible ones.
ZD choice under different effects
Leverage definition. We define the book lev-
erage ratio of firm as:
( )it it
it
it
DLTT DLCBL TA
+= , (3)
where DLTT is the amount of long-term debt 
exceeding maturity of one year, DLC is the 
debt in current liabilities, including long-term 
debt due within one year, TA is the total as-
sets of the firm. The book leverage ratio is 
defined similarly in most recent capital struc-
ture papers [Strebulaev, Yang, 2013; Graham, 
Leary, 2011; Leary, Roberts, 2010; Lemmon, 
Zender, 2010]. The choice of denominator 
is  less important in the context of ZD 
[Strebulaev, Yang, 2013]. If firms apply the 
same accounting rules (IFRS or GAAP) there 
is no need to make adjustments when compar-
ing leverage internationally [Rajan, Zingales, 
1995].
ZD and AZD firms’ definition. We define 
firm as ZD firm in particular year if the 
outstanding amounts of both short-term 
debt (DLC) and long-term debt (DLTT) are 
less than 1% [Strebulaev, Yang, 2013]. For 
comparison purposes, we also will calculate 
the fraction of firms that possess less than 
5% long-term debt in total debt and called 
them as zero long-term debt entities (LTZD). 
We are also going to define the second cat-
egory of firms which can be called as almost 
zero debt (AZD) firms. These firms possess 
a  marginal debt presence in their capital 
structure and are classified as AZD if book 
leverage ratio is less than 5% [Strebulaev, 
Yang, 2013].
The further examination of the ZD (AZD) 
pattern includes more comprehensive set of 
firm- and country-level variables in the log-
it regression analysis.
Firm-level effect. The traditional capital 
structure factors (traditional determinants 
as: Tangibility, Profitability, Growth oppor-
tunities and Size are used as the control 
variables) are unable to explain the presence 
of ZD firms that is why we are aiming to 
evaluate if the ZD (AZD and LTZD) choice 
is attributable to changes in other firm-
specific variables [Bessler et al., 2013]. 
Firstly, tax provisions are suggested to be 
a primary factor for CS choices [Fan, Titman, 
Twite, 2012; De Jong, Kabir, Nguyen 2008]. 
Due to tax deductions are affected by inter-
est payments, we assume our first hypoth-
esis.
Hypothesis 1. Firms with high tax pay-
ments are more likely to be ZD firms and 
these payments cause positive influence 
on firm’s  ZD choice.
Then, perhaps, firms may become debt-
free because of tax deductions from non-debt 
sources [DeAngelo, Masulis, 1980], so we 
state second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. The non-debt tax shield 
affects ZD choice positively.
Firms with ample cash flow can fund in-
vestment opportunities with retained earn-
ings, and thus have less incentive to use 
debt.
Hypothesis 3. Cash flow has a  positive 
impact on a firm’s decision to be debt-free.
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Additionally, low leverage limits the agen-
cy costs of debt [Myers, 1977]. Leverage can 
be very low in cases of agency conflict over 
the future investment timing and additional 
debt issuance [Hackbarth, Mauer, 2012]. 
Becoming the debt-free and mitigating un-
derinvestment problems, we assume the fol-
lowing.
Hypothesis 4. ZD firms to show high 
cash holdings, and reliance on new equity 
financing — both measures cause posi-
tive impact on ZD choice in the firms’ 
CS policy.
We further consider the dividends payout 
ratio as a proxy for the degree of asymmet-
ric information. Firms with low dividend 
ratios are more likely to suffer from high 
informational costs, hence limited access to 
the debt markets. Thus we propose next hy-
pothesis.
Hypothesis 5. Proxy variables for asym-
metric information are positively relat-
ed to probability of maintaining a  ZD 
policy.
Without interest, depreciation and amor-
tization expenses, dividends could be used 
to smooth the earnings of ZD firms. When 
they are joined with high equity issuances, 
higher dividends might indicate a  mean of 
establishing a reputation for moderation in 
expropriating wealth from minority share-
holders [Gomes, 2000].
Hypothesis 6. ZD firms make higher divi-
dends payouts and this measure causes 
positive impact over firms to follow the 
ZD policy.
A  ZD firm’s  stock return volatility re-
flects its business risk, and this volatility 
equals to asset volatility. We use the Altman 
Z-score as the variable for the business risk 
measurement.
Hypothesis 7. The high level of assets risk 
is inherited by ZD firms — the impact of 
interest is positively related to ZD choice.
Country-level effect. Taking into account 
possible substantial differences over the coun-
tries, it is important to examine country-
specific factors in more details. Considering 
the hypotheses described above we are going 
to examine the impact of country-level char-
acteristics on the CS choice.
Hypothesis 8. Difference between com-
mon law countries and civil law countries 
among emerging capital markets is in-
fluential. We use a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for firms from a civil 
law country (and 0 otherwise).
The presence of creditor protection can 
also affect the CS choice. The Creditor 
Protection Score (CPS) which has been in-
troduces by [La Porta et al., 1998] with sev-
eral updates by [Djankov, McLiesh, Shleifer, 
2007] has been substituted by the Strength 
of legal rights index (LRPI) calculated by 
the World Bank. For the regression analysis, 
we determine a  bankruptcy code dummy 
variable, which takes the value of 1 if the 
firm belongs to a country with high creditor 
protection (LRPI is from second, third and 
fourth quartiles) and 0 otherwise.3
Hypothesis 9. Countries with strong bank-
ruptcy code have more ZD firms than 
countries with weak creditor protection, 
thus high level of the creditors protection 
positively affects the ZD choice.
The development of capital markets has 
been hindered by the decencies of the coun-
try’s  corporate governance system and can 
be one of the determinants for firms to follow 
ZD policy [Nivorozhkin, 2015]. The level of 
capital market development is usually meas-
ured by the market capitalization of listed 
firms to country’s GDP, the amount of cred-
its from financial sector over GDP and the 
amount of deposits to financial sector over 
GDP.
Hypothesis 10. The variables which define 
the development of the country’s financial 
system cause negative effect on firms to 
follow the ZD policy.
3  The definition of the LRPI construction is pre-
sented in the Table 1, and its value for each country 
from the sample is shown in the Appendix Table A1.
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Staying in the line with related research 
papers we use GDP per capita growth, and 
the inflation rate as additional control in-
dependent variables in our logistic regres-
sion (see Table 1 for definition of variables).
Sample and Data
Sample construction
Our research is based on the sample of 
emerging markets companies. Based on the 
country classification our sample compris-
es of all actively traded industrial firms 
from 21  countries which are classified as 
emerging markets.4 We collect annual bal-
ance sheet data, income statement and cash 
flow statements data and market data of 
listed firms from the Capital IQ database 
over the period from 2010 to 2015. All 
variables are denominated in US dollars. 
Considering the specific nature of financial 
and utility firms (Capital IQ classification) 
we exclude them from our sample. Staying 
in line with major academic studies, we 
omit firm-year observations with missing 
information on total assets, depreciation 
and amortization, cash, EBIT, retained 
earnings, earnings from continuous op-
erations (or earnings before extraordinary 
items), total equity, total shares outstand-
ing and market capitalization. We then 
winsorize all variables at the 1% and the 
99% tails not to deal with potential outli-
ers. After all data cleaning steps, our final 
panel data set includes 6525  industrial 
firms with a  total of 24  149  firm-year ob-
servations5. An overview of all the varia-
bles we use in our analysis with a detailed 
description of construction are shown in 
Table 1. The list of the countries and their 
4  The data has been obtained from the World 
Bank database. Following the “One China princi-
ple”, the missed country-level indicators for Taiwan 
have been taken equal to Chinese ones.
5  The total number of firm-year observations in-
cluding the lag years is equal to 27 150 firm-year 
observations.
institutional characteristics are presented 
in Appendix Table  A1.
We calculate the book leverage as the ra-
tio of the sum of short- and long-term debt 
to total assets [Devos et al., 2012; Strebulaev, 
Yang, 2013; Bessler et al., 2013]. ZD obser-
vations are firm-year observations with lev-
erage less 1%, AZD observations are firm-
year observations with book leverage less 
5%, and LTZD observations are firm-year 
observations with zero long-term debt.6 The 
Appendix Table A2 provides descriptive sta-
tistics for all variables.
The median book leverage ratio is 23.1% 
for the full sample, whilst this indicator for 
constrained firms is around 20.4% and for 
flexible firms is around to 21.6%. Being con-
strained, firms choose around 23.4% of lever-
age on average, while being flexible the level 
of leverage on average rise to 24.5%. This 
could be a  result of being forced to choose 
lower level of debt in case of financial con-
straints. Here, the preliminary hypothesis 
could be derived
Hypothesis 11. The financing constraints 
(small size and young age due to SA in-
dex) are determinants for the CS choice, 
while the flexibility of financing results 
in rather larger and older firms.
However, the financially flexible firms on 
average are riskier, possess higher cash hold-
ings, they are less tangible and profitable 
comparing to constrained firms. Other var-
iables are in line with expectations and log-
ic as described above.
Results of the econometric models
The results of the econometric models’ anal-
ysis follow the abovementioned hypotheses 
that we structured accordingly in Table 2. 
6  Due to the extremely low level of purely zero-
debt and long-term zero debt firms we assume to 
consider a firm with leverage level less 1% as zero-
debt firm, whilst we assume to consider a firm with 
the fraction of long-term debt in the total amount 
of debt less 5% as zero long-term debt firm.
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Table 1
Variables’ definition
Variable Definition and construction methodology
Firm-level variables
Book leverage Ratio of long- and short-term debt to total book equity
Age Difference between the actual year and a  firm’s  IPO date
Size Natural logarithm of book value of total assets
Market-to-book Market-to-book ratio is calculated as the sum of total assets and market value of 
equity less total stockholders’ equity, to total assets
Tangibility Ratio of fixed assets to book value of total assets
Profitability Ratio of operating income before depreciation to book value of total assets
Payout ratio Ratio of the sum of cash dividends and share repurchases to book value of total assets
Equity issuances Ratio of total equity issuances to book value of total assets
Taxes Ratio of income taxes paid to total book value of total assets
Non-debt tax shield Ratio of depreciation and amortization to book value of total assets
Cash holdings Ratio of cash equivalents to book value of total assets
Business risk Altman Z-score — a credit-strength test that gauges a publicly traded manufacturing 
company’s  likelihood of bankruptcy (source: S&P  Capital IQ database)
Payout dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a  firm has a  payout ratio greater than 
zero in a  given year (and 0  otherwise).
Cash flow Value of cash flow as the sum of earnings from continuous operations and deprecia-
tion and amortization to book assets
Growth  
opportunities
The ratio of growth opportunities is calculated as the sum of market capitalization 
and total debt to book assets
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to book a  value of total assets
Capital  
expenditures
Ratio of capital expenditures to book value of total assets
Country-level variables
Deposits Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institu-
tions as a  share of GDP. See Table A1 for the mean value in all countries (Source: 
World Bank)
Credits Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors 
on a gross basis to the GDP. See Table A1 for the mean value in all countries (Source: 
World Bank)
Market value The share price times the number of shares outstanding (including their several 
classes) for listed domestic companies. Investment funds, unit trusts, and companies 
whose only business goal is to hold shares of other listed companies are excluded. 
Data are end of year values. See Table A1 for the mean value in all countries (Source: 
World Bank)
Inflation rate Measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the 
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be 
fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. See Table A1 for the mean 
value in all countries (Source: World Bank)
GDP per capita Annual real GDP per capita in the country. See Table A1 for the mean value in all 
countries (Source: World Bank)
Legal system Dummy variable that equals 0 for countries with a  common law system, and 1 for 
countries with a  civil law system. See Table A1 for an overview of the legal system 
in all countries (Source: International Monetary Fund)
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Despite our models tested all the hypothe-
ses, we are focusing on our main findings 
respectively to corresponding hypotheses.
Multivariate firm-level analysis
The Table 3 shows the results of our bi-
nary choice (probit) regression models. The 
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if 
a  firm is ZD, AZD and LTZD in a  given 
year (and 0 otherwise). The explanatory 
variables used in the models are one-year 
lagged to avoid endogeneity problems. To 
control country and industry time effect 
we use the country and industry fixed ef-
fects. The co lumns 1, 3, 5 and 7 report the 
results of firm-level specific characteristics, 
whilst the column 1 shows the result of 
model with control variables only, the col-
umn 3 represents the extended model, the 
column 5 includes the dummy variable of 
financially constrained and financially flex-
ible measures, and the column 7 provides 
the results for the extended model with 
dummy variables that include firms belong-
ingness to constrained flexible or uncon-
strained flexible, or constrained inflexible, 
or unconstrained inflexible type.
The Table 3 also provides the economic 
implication by providing the average mar-
ginal effects in probability that a  firm fol-
lows a ZD, AZD or LTZD policy as an answer 
for change in an explanatory variable or the 
change from zero to one for a dummy vari-
able. We compute the probit models for three 
panels: the ZD firms, the AZD firms and 
the LTZD firms to define the determinants 
causing these firms to follow ZD, AZD or 
LTZD policy respectively.
There are several major results that should 
be highlighted.
First of all, the negative intercepts for the 
all three panels imply that these firms are 
less common than debt (levered) firms. The 
usage of standard CS determinants for the 
estimations ZD pattern provides worse results 
comparing to the extended models for the 
all  three panels according to the pseudo 
R-squared value.
Secondly, we examined the set of internal 
and external factors that influence the choice 
of zero leverage policy. It should be speci-
fied, that in most cases the determinants 
are very close for zero and almost zero pan-
els whereas the results differ significantly 
for long-term debt absence. This could be 
explained by the fact, that on emerging mar-
kets total debt prove to show more reliable 
results since even short-term debt act could 
act for long-term purposes. Thus, total debt 
helps more in describing the capital struc-
ture choice of a  firm, whereas the results 
on long-term debt choice help with the in-
terpretation on the firm’s creditworthiness, 
flexibility and constraints existence.
Within the set of internal characteristics, 
the following results are worth discussing.
The positive coefficient of the income 
taxes paid for the panel  A  and B  (ZD and 
AZD firms respectively) proves that firms 
with higher tax payments are more likely 
to be debt-free (Hypothesis 1), whereas this 
coefficient is statistically insignificant for 
Table 1 (continued)
Variable Definition and construction methodology
Bankruptcy code Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country has a  high legal rights protection score 
(LRPI belongs to second, third and fourth quartiles), and 0 – otherwise. Strength of 
legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect 
the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges from 
0 to 12, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed to expand 
access to credit. See Table A1 for an overview of the bankruptcy codes in all countries 
(Source: World Bank)
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Table 2
The tested hypotheses
Hypothesis Description Result obtained  (dependency pattern)
Hypothesis 1 Firms with high tax payments are more likely to 
be ZD firms and these payments cause positive 
influence on firm’s  ZD choice
Accepted, positive and statistically sig-
nificant dependency for ZD and AZD 
choices
Hypothesis 2 The non-debt tax shield affects ZD choice posi-
tively
Mostly not accepted, not proved under 
statistically significant levels, hence 
revealed the negative dependency for 
LTZD choice
Hypothesis 3 Cash flow has a  positive impact on a  firm’s  deci-
sion to be debt-free
Accepted, proved for ZD and AZD 
choices
Hypothesis 4 ZD firms to show high cash holdings, and reli-
ance on new equity financing — both measures 
cause positive impact on ZD choice in the firms’ 
CS policy
Cash holdings proved our expectations 
while the equity issuance showed nega-
tive impact without necessary statisti-
cal significance
Hypothesis 5 We assume that proxy variables for asymmetric 
information are positively related to probability 
of maintaining a  ZD policy
Negative statistical significant impact 
only for AZD choice
Hypothesis 6 ZD firms make higher dividends payouts and this 
measure causes positive impact over firms to fol-
low the ZD policy
The negative dependency for ZD and 
AZD, while opposite for LTZD; hypoth-
esis have not reached the required sta-
tistical significance level
Hypothesis 7 The high level of assets risk is inherited by ZD 
firms – the impact of interest is positively re-
lated to ZD choice
Accepted, the positive and statistically 
significant result for all panels
Hypothesis 8 Difference between common law countries and 
civil law countries among emerging capital mar-
kets is influential
No significant linkage obtained
Hypothesis 9 Countries with strong bankruptcy code have more 
ZD firms than countries with weak creditor pro-
tection, thus high level of the creditors protection 
positively affects the ZD choice
Accepted for LTZD. The results for 
other measures are insignificant
Hypothesis 10 The variables which define the development of the 
country’s  financial system cause negative effect 
on firms to follow the ZD policy
Mostly accepted, but some variables have 
not showed necessary statistically sig-
nificance level
Hypothesis 11 The financing constraints (small size and young 
age due to SA index) are determinants for the CS 
choice, while the flexibility of financing results in 
rather larger and older firms
Partially accepted regarding the impact 
of financial flexibility
the panel C: the LTZD firms. Increase in 
the income tax ratio to total assets among 
the ZD and AZD firms results in the around 
10% and 40% increase in probability to fol-
low the ZD and the AZD policy respective-
ly. Switching to the LTZD firms the overall 
result of the income tax ratio shows the 
statistical insignificance.
The negative coefficients on profitability 
for the ZD and the AZD firms’ panels (co-
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lumns 3, 5 and 7) shows that the less profit-
able firms are more likely to follow the debt-
free (around 2% marginal effect) and almost 
debt-free (around 15% marginal effect) poli-
cies. The profitability measure is insignificant 
for the LTZD choice again supporting the 
idea, that firms consider long term debt to-
gether with the short-term debt for strategic 
purposes, thus, the one part of the total debt 
cannot be explained by the same determinants 
but rather explain the determinants of long-
term debt accessibility. To prove that argu-
ment, we see the significance of size (the 
greater the size, the more probable for the 
firm to get a long-term debt which decreases 
the probability of zero-debt), tangibility (the 
same interpretation) and business risk (the 
greater the risk, the greater the probability 
of zero-debt).
As for the ZD and AZD, we obtain an-
other set of major factors, mostly responsi-
ble for the level of unpredictability of the 
future outcomes: growth opportunities, prof-
itability, cash holdings and business risk. 
Particularly, firms that follow ZD and AZD 
policies have lower growth opportunities, 
higher market-to-book ratios. Firms follow-
ing the AZD and LTZD policies are smaller, 
while the later ones are also older (the Age 
variable shows insignificant level for panels 
A: the ZD firms and panel B: the AZD firms, 
while the direction of impact for the panel 
A  is negative and for the panel B  positive). 
At the same time, the positive coefficients 
cash holdings (for the ZD and AZD firms) 
can support our debt choice argument based 
on agency costs (Hypothesis 4). The increase 
of cash holdings to avoid underinvestment 
issues [Opler et al., 1999] shows the highest 
significance: a  change in cash holdings is 
related to an increase in the probability to 
become ZD or AZD in the range of 4% and 
17% for the ZD and AZD firms respectively. 
Moreover, the positive cash flow has a  posi-
tive impact over the ZD and AZD choice 
(Hypothesis 3). We found out that equity 
issues demonstrate negative impact over AZD 
choice — the contradiction of the pecking 
order theory — the firms use equity instead 
of debt for financing, rather than recapi-
talization (Hypothesis 4).
A  payout ratio shows statistical insig-
nificance for all three groups (Hypothesis 
6), whereas the dividends payout dummy 
variable negatively affects the AZD policy 
choice (Hypothesis 5) and does not support 
out hypothesis regarding the positive im-
pact of asymmetric information proxy. 
Additionally, the high asset risk of firms 
from all panels show that the riskier firms 
are more likely to choose ZD, AZD and 
LTZD policies (Hypothesis 7) — these find-
ings are consistent with the inference that 
the risky firms are constrained to use debt 
[Bolton, Freixas, 2000].
We see from adding the financial con-
straints and financial flexibility dummies 
(column 7), that the ZD choice is more com-
mon among unconstrained inflexible firms, 
the AZD choice is more common among 
unconstrained both flexible and inflexible, 
and constrained inflexible firms. Thus, we 
state that the inflexibility is the dominant 
motive to follow the ZD. And AZD. Still, 
when we consider LTZD choice, it is more 
common only for constrained inflexible firms 
(Hypothesis 11). From that observation we 
could state that constrained firms either 
try to rely on short-term debt in the volume 
that exceeds 5% of total capital if they are 
flexible or they are forced to stick to long-
term zero debt policy if they are both in-
flexible and constrained. Thus, their choice 
of strategy is also to a large extent depend-
ent on flexibility. Overall, we could sum-
marize that the firm’s choice of zero-lever-
age is not always necessarily a  forced case 
of financial constraints. Even if the firms 
are not constrained, they tend to keep the 
flexibility.
Multivariate country-level analysis
The use of country fixed effects in our probit 
models in Table 3 (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) 
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cannot fully explain the increasing percentage 
of ZD, AZD and LTZD firms. Assuming the 
considerable cross-sectional variances over the 
countries, it is necessary to examine country-
specific factors in more detail.
The results of probit regressions involv-
ing the set of country-level variables are 
shown in Table 3 (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). 
The explanatory power of just country var-
iables is extremely low (column 2) for the 
all policies choice. Moreover, including the 
country-level variables instead of country 
fixed-effects leads to lower explanatory 
power of models than ones with only firm-
level characteristics, country and industry 
fixed-effects meaning that the capital struc-
ture decisions are driven mainly by internal 
factors [Mitton, 2008]. Analyzing the more 
“powerful” model (co lumn 8) according to 
pseudo R-squared all the firm-level charac-
teristics remain the same impact as described 
above. In addition, we find that the level of 
credits boosts the usage of corporate bor-
rowings for the ZD and AZD firms, while 
it results in the LTZD choice. Also, the depth 
of financial system (deposits variable) to-
gether with high market capitalization to 
country’s  GDP (market value variable) are 
positively related to AZD choice (Hypothesis 
10). High level of country’s financial system 
development decreases the chance to follow 
the LTZD policy which goes in line with our 
hypothesis. Additionally, the high creditors 
protection (bankruptcy code variable) in-
creases chances to be long-term debt-free 
firm (Hypothesis 4). The impact is the same 
for the AZD and ZD firms, but the inference 
does not show the statistical significance. 
This finding is close to our argumentation 
on financial flexibility and constraint. The 
greater the creditor’s  protection level is, 
the tougher are conditions for financially 
constrained firms. This will influence firms’ 
choice of long-term debt mostly and in case 
of their inflexible position will most prob-
able lead to zero-leverage choice. This is 
proved by the results of financial constraints 
and flexibility measures for these specifica-
tions.
Robustness tests
In order to check the robustness of our firm- 
and country-level results for the AZD firms 
we check whether the 10% threshold can be 
used for the description of AZD firms.7
According to the results, the AZD firms 
are smaller and older, they show higher mar-
ket-to-book ratio and lower both profitabil-
ity and growth opportunities. The impact of 
income tax level, cash flow, cash holdings 
and asset risk coincide with inference of AZD 
firms with 5% leverage threshold.
By adding the country specific variables, 
we have found the positive influence of in-
flation rate, market capitalization level and 
bankruptcy code to follow the AZD policy. 
Generally, the robustness test proved our 
previously received results.
Conclusion
Our study provides insights into the pattern 
of firms’ choices to follow a ZD policy, a be-
havior that cannot be fully explained by the 
standard theories of capital structure. The 
growth of ZD, AZD and LTZD rates of has 
become a  phenomenon not only among de-
veloped markets, but emerging ones as well. 
Our analysis show that the choice of zero-
debt policy is mostly driven by internal fac-
tors rather than country-level ones, which 
in term explains why we could observe the 
ZD phenomenon in a  global arena.
The major determinants that influence 
the ZD policy are represented by growth op-
portunities, business risk, profitability and 
cash holdings thus approximating the level 
of future outcomes predictability and the 
need for future investments as well.
7  Due to arguments in academic literature re-
garding the optimal or necessarily required level 
of leverage for indicating the almost zero-debt pat-
tern. The results of the regressions are omitted, 
but can be provided upon the request.
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We observe that the leverage ratios based 
on total debt provide more information on 
capital structure choice on emerging capi-
tal markets in comparison with the long-
term debt ratios only. This finding goes in 
line with the previous literature that is 
focused on the total debt, supporting our 
proposition that both long term and short-
term debt could be used for strategic pur-
poses on emerging capital markets [Ghoul 
et al., 2018].
We considered two major motives for ZD 
behavior: financial constraints and financial 
flexibility. We show that financial flexibil-
ity motive is true for firms whether they 
are constrained or not. Thus, firms try to 
keep the flexibility to have the opportunities 
for large investments in the future even if 
they are not forced to stick to the zero-debt 
policy by the market.
The further analysis should look deeper 
into the governance mechanisms that could 
provoke managerial entrenchment motives 
and ownership issues to consider the risk 
aversion level of different types of investors. 
The introduction of these factors on emerg-
ing capital markets would decrease the sam-
ple available for the investigation but will 
help with the thorough discussion of other 
possible motives for becoming a  ZD firm.
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Appendix
 Table A1
 COUNTRIES’ DESCRIPTION
The table summarizes the country-level variables. LRPI denotes the Legal Rights Protection Index 
from the World Bank database. Mean values are reported for the variables deposits, credits, GDP per 
capita, inflation rate, market capitalization of listed firms, total tax rate, and the percentage of zero-debt 
(ZD), almost zero-debt (AZD) and long-term almost zero-debt (LTZD)* firms during the sample period.
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Brazil Civil law 53.20 99.21 11 018.84 6.22 50.14 2  —  Low LRPI 77 5.41% 12.21% 1.82%
Bulgaria Civil law 64.24 65.55 7358.97 1.68 8.74 9  —  High LRPI 24 2.10% 13.45% 10.08%
Chile Civil law 44.04 113.08 13 797.86 2.62 111.73 4  —  Low LRPI 64 0.78% 6.23% 0.62%
China Civil law 47.03 155.85 6165.65 2.39 56.71 4  —  Low LRPI 1765 0.39% 4.49% 10.81%
Croatia Civil law 68.34 87.63 13 433.71 1.52 32.25 5  —  High LRPI 37 3.62% 11.96% 5.98%
Estonia Civil law 53.31 82.50 17 190.17 2.00 7.58 7  — High LRPI 10 0.00% 2.04% 4.08%
India Common law 62.62 75.71 1425.17 9.17 75.90 6  — High LRPI 101 3.78% 14.60% 7.89%
Indonesia Civil law 31.88 40.29 3316.26 5.53 43.47 5  — High LRPI 236 2.05% 6.79% 7.12%
Israel Common law 75.40 86.17 33 484.18 1.80 75.24 6  — High LRPI 258 1.48% 5.11% 3.95%
Malaysia Common law 121.82 133.18 9955.59 2.07 143.46 7  — High LRPI 535 0.16% 5.49% 6.54%
Mexico Civil law 26.22 47.16 9361.52 3.93 39.36 10  — High LRPI 42 0.79% 1.89% 1.89%
Peru Civil law 31.51 21.59 5777.48 3.01 48.53 8  — High LRPI 30 0.56% 3.33% 2.00%
Poland Civil law 49.38 66.60 13 120.37 2.07 33.51 7  — High LRPI 185 1.26% 9.64% 5.42%
Romania Civil law 32.01 43.56 8979.25 3.61 6.96 10  — High LRPI 16 6.33% 13.92% 2.53%
Russia Civil law 40.36 42.36 12 457.71 8.88 40.63 6  — High LRPI 59 7.32% 13.18% 1.01%
South Africa Common law 59.94 180.72 6870.06 5.49 241.60 5  — High LRPI 118 0.00% 6.44% 4.75%
Taiwan Civil law 47.03 155.85 6165.65 2.39 56.71 4  — Low LRPI 1138 0.00% 2.57% 7.17%
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Russia Civil law 40.36 42.36 12 457.71 8.88 40.63 6  — High LRPI 59 7.32% 13.18% 1.01%
South Africa Common law 59.94 180.72 6870.06 5.49 241.60 5  — High LRPI 118 0.00% 6.44% 4.75%
Taiwan Civil law 47.03 155.85 6165.65 2.39 56.71 4  — Low LRPI 1138 0.00% 2.57% 7.17%
Stiglitz J. E., Weiss A. 1981. Credit rationing in 
markets with imperfect information. Ameri-
can Economic Review 71 (3): 393–410.
Strebulaev  I. A., Yang B. 2013. The mystery 
of zero-leverage firms. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 109 (1): 1–23.
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Table А1 (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Thailand Civil law 104.95 152.59 5543.93 1.77 84.86 3  — Low LRPI 316 0.21% 4.24% 9.10%
Turkey Civil law 49.74 78.24 10 006.20 7.74 31.72 3  — Low LRPI 176 2.93% 10.66% 6.35%
Vietnam Civil law 12.44 114.70 1704.88 7.86 23.64 7  — High LRPI 249 0.00% 2.82% 15.85%
N o t e: * — due to the extremely low level of purely zero-debt and long-term zero debt firms we assume to considera firm 
with leverage level less 1% as zero-debt firm, whilst we assume to consider a  firm with the fraction of long-
term debt in the total amount of debt less 5% as long-term zero-debt firms (LTZD).
Table A2
 SUMMARY  STATISTICS
Variable
All firms Financially Constrained Firms Financially Flexible Firms
N Mean SD Median Min Max N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Leverage 24 149 0.254 0.248 0.231 0.000 24.773 9639 0.234 0.309 0.204 4520 0.245 0.237 0.216
Size 24 149 5.783 1.750 5.730 1.915 10.067 9639 4.270 1.067 4.311 4520 5.377 2.071 4.736
Age 24 149 10.414 6.543 10.000 0.000 35.000 9639 6.319 4.995 5.000 4520 9.036 6.040 8.000
Market-to-book 24 149 1.480 1.154 1.155 0.144 46.388 9639 1.481 1.354 1.104 4520 1.634 1.419 1.229
Tangibility 24 149 0.315 0.209 0.296 0.000 0.991 9639 0.319 0.208 0.299 4520 0.306 0.164 0.298
Profitability 24 149 0.043 0.100 0.043 –4.845 7.969 9639 0.038 0.139 0.045 4520 0.035 0.084 0.041
Payout 24 149 0.019 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.852 9639 0.016 0.027 0.006 4520 0.021 0.024 0.016
Equity issuances 24 149 0.023 0.083 0.000 0.000 4.776 9639 0.036 0.108 0.000 4520 0.033 0.094 0.000
Income taxes 24 149 0.010 0.014 0.008 –0.144 0.365 9639 0.010 0.015 0.007 4520 0.010 0.013 0.008
Non-debt tax shield 24 149 0.003 0.021 0.000 0.000 2.666 9639 0.003 0.031 0.000 4520 0.001 0.008 0.000
Cash holdings 24 149 0.109 0.097 0.085 0.000 0.869 9639 0.106 0.108 0.073 4520 0.156 0.114 0.130
Business risk 23 499 2.653 2.129 2.180 –1.060 12.600 9372 2.864 2.360 2.340 4502 3.113 2.484 2.490
Cash flow 24 149 0.030 0.108 0.033 –4.963 6.805 9639 0.021 0.151 0.033 4520 0.024 0.088 0.034
Growth opportunities 24 149 1.206 1.185 0.870 0.024 45.813 9639 1.222 1.396 0.837 4520 1.394 1.447 0.966
Note: the table shows the number of firm-year observations (N), the mean, the standard deviation (SD), the median as well as the minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) value of each variable (only for the all firms).
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Table А1 (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Thailand Civil law 104.95 152.59 5543.93 1.77 84.86 3  — Low LRPI 316 0.21% 4.24% 9.10%
Turkey Civil law 49.74 78.24 10 006.20 7.74 31.72 3  — Low LRPI 176 2.93% 10.66% 6.35%
Vietnam Civil law 12.44 114.70 1704.88 7.86 23.64 7  — High LRPI 249 0.00% 2.82% 15.85%
N o t e: * — due to the extremely low level of purely zero-debt and long-term zero debt firms we assume to considera firm 
with leverage level less 1% as zero-debt firm, whilst we assume to consider a  firm with the fraction of long-
term debt in the total amount of debt less 5% as long-term zero-debt firms (LTZD).
Table A2
 SUMMARY  STATISTICS
Variable
All firms Financially Constrained Firms Financially Flexible Firms
N Mean SD Median Min Max N Mean SD Median N Mean SD Median
Leverage 24 149 0.254 0.248 0.231 0.000 24.773 9639 0.234 0.309 0.204 4520 0.245 0.237 0.216
Size 24 149 5.783 1.750 5.730 1.915 10.067 9639 4.270 1.067 4.311 4520 5.377 2.071 4.736
Age 24 149 10.414 6.543 10.000 0.000 35.000 9639 6.319 4.995 5.000 4520 9.036 6.040 8.000
Market-to-book 24 149 1.480 1.154 1.155 0.144 46.388 9639 1.481 1.354 1.104 4520 1.634 1.419 1.229
Tangibility 24 149 0.315 0.209 0.296 0.000 0.991 9639 0.319 0.208 0.299 4520 0.306 0.164 0.298
Profitability 24 149 0.043 0.100 0.043 –4.845 7.969 9639 0.038 0.139 0.045 4520 0.035 0.084 0.041
Payout 24 149 0.019 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.852 9639 0.016 0.027 0.006 4520 0.021 0.024 0.016
Equity issuances 24 149 0.023 0.083 0.000 0.000 4.776 9639 0.036 0.108 0.000 4520 0.033 0.094 0.000
Income taxes 24 149 0.010 0.014 0.008 –0.144 0.365 9639 0.010 0.015 0.007 4520 0.010 0.013 0.008
Non-debt tax shield 24 149 0.003 0.021 0.000 0.000 2.666 9639 0.003 0.031 0.000 4520 0.001 0.008 0.000
Cash holdings 24 149 0.109 0.097 0.085 0.000 0.869 9639 0.106 0.108 0.073 4520 0.156 0.114 0.130
Business risk 23 499 2.653 2.129 2.180 –1.060 12.600 9372 2.864 2.360 2.340 4502 3.113 2.484 2.490
Cash flow 24 149 0.030 0.108 0.033 –4.963 6.805 9639 0.021 0.151 0.033 4520 0.024 0.088 0.034
Growth opportunities 24 149 1.206 1.185 0.870 0.024 45.813 9639 1.222 1.396 0.837 4520 1.394 1.447 0.966
Note: the table shows the number of firm-year observations (N), the mean, the standard deviation (SD), the median as well as the minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) value of each variable (only for the all firms).
Данное исследование сфокусировано на пробелах в теории формирования структуры капитала, 
касающихся мотивов выбора нулевого уровня долга. На выборке компаний из 21 страны 
с развивающимися рынками капитала за период с 2010 по 2015 г. мы проследили, что выбор 
политики структуры капитала обусловлен в  первую очередь мотивом финансовой гибкости. 
Вторым по значимости мотивом являются финансовые ограничения. Мы определили, что 
основными детерминантами выбора нулевого долга являются возможности роста, бизнес-риск, 
доходность компании и  наличие у  компании денежных средств. Наши результаты показали, 
что компании с нулевым долгом зачастую малого размера, менее прибыльные, более рисковые 
и располагают высокими денежными ресурсами. Нами установлено, что внутрикорпоративные 
факторы более значимы при выборе нулевого долга, чем макроэкономические условия.
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